The Right Reasons View is an unwavering view of peer disagreements, highlighting the role of common evidence of the first order in peer disdons. According to Kelly (2005), we can present the discovery of a division by peers as follows: Tyler Cowen and Robin Hanson have argued that many differences are “dishonest” because people generally prefer their own positions for various reasons in the face of differences of opinion. This contrasts with results such as the Aumann Agreement, which proposed to update his convictions in each other`s directions.  Many other disagreements concern few people. Bob, Rob, Hob and Gob work in a small hotel and wonder if they should ask for increases in their hourly wages. After the discussion, Bob thinks they should, Rob and Hob think they shouldn`t do it, and Gob is undecided. If Bob learns all this about his three colleagues, what would be his doxastic reaction to this mixed bag of concordance and disagreement? Christensen (2007) responds to this challenge by the fact that only possible disagreements show that we are fallible, but that real disagreements show that someone did make a mistake. As we already know that we are fallible epistemic agents, thinking about possible peer disagreements does not provide any information that requires further doxastic changes. On the other hand, the discovery of a real disagreement between peers gives us information that we lacked. If there was a disagreement with his peers, one of the parties made a mistake. While the possibility of an error does not require a revision of faith, the likelihood of having made an error increases. Weight equality is perhaps the most debated opinion on the epistemic importance of differences of opinion.
Competing views of peer disputes are better understood as a rejection of different aspects of weight equality, so it is an appropriate place to begin our review. From our point of view, the Equal Weight View is a combination of three assertions: this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in terms of religion, politics, morality and philosophy. When it comes to debates about free will, the death penalty, affirmative action and many other controversial standard topics, say to the experts who disagree with you: “These people just don`t understand the problems,” “You`re not very smart,” “You haven`t thought about it much,” et cetera, and so on is so irrational that you should know. to say that, at least if you are honest with yourself and are informed of the status of the free will debate.